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Abstract 
What do governments, international organizations and stakeholders mean when they say that 
proposals for new regulation should be systematically appraised? And do regulators really use the 
results of appraisal? In this article, we consider two dimensions of policy appraisal: the breadth and 
scope of the empirical analysis, and the utilization of impact assessment. We use these two 
dimensions to produce an explanatory typology with four types. The types enable us to review the 
literature systematically, exposing gaps as well as documenting the results. In the final part of the 
article we build hypotheses that link quality of analysis and utilization, thus showing how future 
research may become less descriptive and more inclined to test explicit hypotheses. 
 
  
1. Introduction 
Robust, evidence-based appraisal of proposed regulation is a fundamental aim of the so-called 
‘smart regulation’ agenda pursued by governments, the European Union (EU) and international 
bodies such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In the past 
decade, as impact assessment (IA) has spread across most OECD countries, the debate on IA has 
moved from issues of adoption (Radaelli 2005; Staronová 2010; De Francesco, Radaelli and 
Troeger 2012) to those of usage and utilization. For policy makers, audit bodies and social scientists 
alike the key preoccupation concerns how to get results from this policy instrument. The EU in 
particular has added a multi-level dimension to these challenges, because the domestic and EU-level 
appraisal systems have several points of contact. For example, EU legislation is first appraised by 
the European Commission, and then it is examined with IA tools at the stage of implementation into 
national legal systems. This explains why the topic of ‘quality of IA’ – or the appraisal of policy 
appraisal – is so popular today across Europe and the OECD countries. 
Policy makers have expressed interest (in various fora; such as the EU and the OECD) on quality 
benchmarks in the adoption and implementation of IA. There are various motivations for this. The 
first ambition is to manage regulatory systems. To illustrate, indicators on the quality of IA help 
government-wide regulatory oversight bodies map progress on their regulatory reform agenda and 
stimulate discussion with departments and regulatory agencies. Linked to this, information on IA 
alerts the officers responsible for the overall regulatory reform agenda on where exactly progress is 
slower. Indeed, indicators and measures should point to the remedies or program changes that 
would improve performance. The second push is communication. Information on the performance 
of IA and regulation is a key element of a communication strategy at different stages of regulatory 
reform. This is particularly important in restoring trust in the business environment and in the 
regulatory systems, among firms as well as citizens. Finally, IA appraisals are carried out to 
promote accountability. Departments and agencies are accountable to a variety of political 
institutions (in primis, the Parliament) and ‘social constituencies’. Clearly, the most important end-
users of regulatory reform are ministers, parliamentarians, and citizens. Gathering information on 
the quality of IAs is a way for these actors to hold the bureaucracy to account. 
However, what does quality actually mean in this context? How can it be measured? And, what are 
the best strategies to explain it, and make use of this information in managing regulatory reform? 
We address these questions by reviewing key studies in the literature appraising IA. Section 2 
explores different ways in which quality can be conceptualised and introduces a four-fold typology. 
This typology is then used in Section 3 to structure our selective review of the literature – with 
examples drawn from the United Kingdom (UK), United States (US) and the EU. Section 4 draws 
the article to a conclusion, suggesting three main findings and building hypotheses for further 
research.  
 
2. The concept of quality 
Notions of IA quality, and their measurement, are intrinsically related to the standard benchmarks 
of regulatory quality. Radaelli and De Francesco (2007) revise the standard benchmark of 
regulatory quality, such as efficiency, access to the regulatory system, transparency, use of 
evidence, and involvement of stakeholders via participation. But when we talk about IA, we are not 
immediately interested in the quality of rules, but in the quality of the process that has produced a 
given regulation. Radaelli and Fritsch (2012) suggest that regulatory quality can be examined along 
the whole life cycle of regulation: 
 Input Regulatory quality in input addresses what happens at the 
outset of the regulatory life cycle with design activities. Specifically, the input dimension includes 
the formal adoption of policy appraisal, the provision of training events on the economic analysis of 
regulation and consultation, as well as the establishment of a regulatory oversight body that 
scrutinises the appraisals produced. 
 Moving forward in the regulatory life cycle, the next dimension of 
quality concerns process; connecting the inputs and producing results. Typically, processes define 
the scope, and extent, of tools like impact assessment (see Organisation for Economic Co-Operation 
and Development 2009 for a more extensive discussion). 
 Output refers to the activities carried out in a given period. This 
dimension includes the absolute or relative (in per cent) number of primary laws and subordinate 
regulations appraised, the degree of compliance with guidelines, and the magnitude of analyses. 
Officers rely on various guideline documents for IA, specific tools used in IA such as benefit-cost 
analysis, and standards for consultation. Of course, guidance on new regulatory tools can be of good 
or bad quality (Radaelli and De Francesco 2007), which is why government bodies in the UK even 
produce guidelines on how to design better guidance (Better Regulation Executive 2009). 
 When we think of intermediary outcomes we are concerned with 
behavioural and cognitive change, considering how regulators and inspectors perceive regulation as 
well as how citizens and the business community rate policy appraisal and, more generally, the 
regulatory efforts of the government. Data on inspections and enforcements also belong to this 
category. 
 Finally, the causal chain should also show the effects of regulatory 
reform on final outcomes, such as number of new firms created and other classic economic 
indicators that are causally linked to regulatory activity. Thus, if a government is committed to 
simple, targeted, efficient, proportionate and fair regulation, we would expect to find causal effects 
downstream. 
Consequently, a high quality IA is based on robust and consistent standards, and it is grounded in 
robust economic analysis; but we should also see the results of the assessment activity in the final 
regulations. However, we can have good quality IAs and regulations that are not efficient, simple, 
proportionate, and fair. This may be the result of different variables at work. For instance, we can 
reason that IA is produced according to the guidelines, that measurement takes place, that the 
estimations of costs and benefits are overall accurate and realistic. And yet, regulators may not 
actually use the IA when taking decisions. Organisations can be ‘hypocritical’; they can produce 
evidence that is not used in their decision-making process (Brunsson 1989). Regulatory agencies 
may be under pressure to produce evidence, but may then use political thinking to steer the course 
of regulation. Instead of evidence: thus, we end up with politics-inspired policy instead of evidence-
based. Even independent regulatory oversight bodies may adopt political criteria when they review 
the IAs produced by agencies, as some authors working on the US case have argued in the past 
(most notably West 2005 on the internalisation of political preferences in the US Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs). These bodies may delay regulation or ask agencies for more 
analysis because the proposed regulations are not in line with the regulatory philosophy of the 
White House. 
To simplify these complex relationships, we discuss two dimensions of IA. We have two 
independent variables along the X and Y axis that produce an outcome in the four cells (our 
dependent variable). This is a common typological device called ‘explanatory typology’ (Elman 
2005). 
The first independent variable concerns the IA document. Does the impact statement comply with 
guidelines on policy appraisal? Do the estimates of costs and benefits reflect the best available 
evidence? Are tools such as benefit-cost analysis used correctly? Has regulatory bias been reduced 
in the final choice of an option or another? 
The second refers to the IA usage in decision making and regulatory oversight, i.e. whether policy 
makers actually use the IA or leave it to gather dust in a drawer. We distinguish two types of usage 
here: to inform political decisions (evidence-based policy making) and to control the bureaucracy 
(regulatory oversight). 
 With regards to evidence-based policy making, authors studied whether 
regulators use the evidence contained in the IA and how the latter informs the legislative or 
regulatory decision-making process (Carroll 2010; Coletti and Radaelli 2013). Of course, ‘using 
evidence’ is a rather ambiguous term. As the literature on knowledge utilisation (Boswell 2008; 
Radaelli 2010a; Schrefler 2010; Dunlop et al. 2012; Weiss 1979) suggests there is an instrumental 
type of utilisation when regulators draw on IAs to improve the contents of the regulatory choice, 
and a more strategic usage where evidence from appraisal is used to legitimate a pre-existing 
political preference. We know that policy-makers often learn politically: They use information and 
evidence to tweak policy with the expectation to increase popularity and win elections, not with the 
aim of improving on the efficiency and fairness of policy (May 1992). 
 As to regulatory oversight, scholars explored explore whether 
governments use IA, and key tools in policy appraisal such as benefit-cost analysis, to exercise 
control of the bureaucracy (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987; Horn and Shepsle 1989; Posner 
2001; Shapiro 2005). More generally, it is plausible to assume that RIA is a tool to increase the 
power of what has been variously defined as ‘the Presidential administration’ in the US (Kagan 
2001) or the ‘core executive’ in the UK (Dodds 2006). Accordingly, the main political effect is an 
increase in the power of the central structures within the executive.  
By combining these two dimensions – the quality of analysis and usage – we generate four cases 
(see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Four-Fold Typology of Impact Assessment Types 
 
‘Perfunctory’ IAs are a ritualistic exercise (quadrant 1): there may be provisions for IA but actually 
very little analytic work is carried out in the preparation of regulation, and evidence is not 
systematically reported in documents that can be discussed by cabinet committees or regulators (a 
phenomenon reported by Radaelli 2009). 
Next to this are the cases are when bad analysis is used to inform decisions. Imagine regulators that 
draw on ‘back-of-the-envelope’ rough estimates’ (quadrant 2). Most likely, they do this because 
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they know that the low quality evidence has been produced to support their pre-fabricated 
preferences about regulatory choice. In these politicised circumstances, it doesn’t matter whether 
the analysis has depth and robustness, provided that there is some analysis that goes in the direction 
favoured by the regulators. This is of course a source of high political bias in political choice. It 
opens the door to all sorts of manipulation of what is supposed to be an evidence-based process. 
When there is robust analysis but the regulators do not look at the evidence, the IA is reduced to 
little more than ‘background homework’ (quadrant 3). In this case, policy analysis does not speak 
the truth to power (to paraphrase Wildavsky 1979) either because the policy-makers have no faith in 
regulatory policy appraisal or because the evidence runs counter to the political priorities of the 
decision-makers. There are also pragmatic reasons why this can happen, not necessarily linked to 
political preferences. It can be that within an agency (McGarity 1991) or inside a government 
department there are different types of professionals. In some European countries economists write 
the IA, but the development of policy proposals is territory for the lawyers. Often there are different 
bureaus, one that prepares the IA and one that develops regulation. When this happens, even good 
IAs may end up being considered like background studies, but the real decisions are taken by 
different officers using different types of arguments and reasons. 
The last cell for consideration (quadrant 4) is the optimistic scenario where IAs are robust and 
inform the regulatory decision-making process. We called this a case of ‘policy learning’ because 
regulation is managed with the tools that are supposed to provide the evidence-based input to 
decision-makers. The only problem here may be one of time alignment: the decision may be urgent, 
and the analysis may take time. We know that the time lines of knowledge production and policy 
decisions rarely run on parallel lines (see for example, Dunlop 2010 on the policy appraisal of 
biofuels). So, for example, if life-savings regulations are needed in a short period of time, it may be 
unwise to wait for the long time necessary to sift evidence and to peer review economic analysis. 
This leads to the principle of proportionate analysis as understood in IA: the depth of analysis must 
match the characteristics of the problem under consideration. Analysis ought to be as good as the 
entity of the regulatory problem suggests. 
 
3. Reviewing the literature 
We review the literature using our two dimensions of analysis and utilisation, noting that it is not 
common to combine the two. To be clear, what follows is not a comprehensive review, but rather 
we have selected key studies that exemplify the different approaches to exploring the quality of 
impact assessment. 
 
Quality of analysis 
Policy appraisals cover a variety of policy areas, many of them highly technical in nature. In order 
to replicate IA analyses, and thereby assess their quality, scholars would require both disciplinary 
and interdisciplinary knowledge and skills in areas as diverse as animal health, radio waves or 
corporate taxes. Although some IA scholars engage in in-depth, qualitative analyses of specific 
policy appraisals, the majority tend to use proxies for quality of analysis. We distinguish three types 
of proxies: the presence of guideline items (e.g., problem definition, estimation of costs, etc) in an 
existing IA, measured with scorecards; questionnaires exploring features of the IA deemed relevant 
by the scholar, and, finally, qualitative information is then converted into quantitative data. 
Scorecards are arguably the most widely used approach to study quality. These benchmarks concern 
the analysis of samples of IA to establish whether they provide the information that they are 
supposed to convey to decision makers, according to IA drafting guidance documents and good 
international practice. An important caveat is that by examining the quality of IA in this way one 
cannot say anything about the plausibility of the analyses presented. After all, regulators may tick 
all the boxes required by the guidelines but deliver a poor analysis based on weak or flawed data. 
On the other hand, scorecards may be attractive to non-specialists in highly technical policy fields. 
Plus, the scorecard approach is not very time-consuming, enabling scholars to evaluate a large 
number of IAs and thereby improving the validity of the results.  
 
 Hahn and collaborators were the first to use scorecard approaches in their study of 
US IAs. In line with US official guidance, their scorecard puts a high premium on economic 
impacts, benefit-cost analysis, point and range estimates and cost effectiveness. Hahn and Dudley 
(2004) look at 55 IAs prepared during the Reagan, George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations, 
reporting slight improvement over time although average scores were often low. Hahn (2005), 
referring to earlier work, discusses an evaluation of 168 IAs prepared between 1981 and 1986; 
further studies include Hahn and Tetlock (2008). Hahn’s work was highly influential to the study of 
policy appraisal but appears limited. It reflects the somewhat narrow perspective of US IA which 
mainly focuses on economic impacts of new regulations and their quantification and monetisation. 
In contrast to, say, IAs prepared by the European Commission, US IAs – and therefore Hahn and 
collaborators – say little about impacts on the environment or society more broadly. Clearly 
inspired by Hahn’s work, Fraas and Lutter (2013) assessed an evaluation of IAs prepared by the US 
Environmental Protection Agency. 
 Renda (2006) used the scorecard approach in an EU context, studying all 70 IAs 
produced by the European Commission between 2003 and 2005, the first years after the EU adopted 
this approach to policy formulation. The scorecard consisted of more than 200 items, documenting 
the breadth and scope of policy appraisal at EU level. Apart from cost-benefit analysis, Renda’s 
scorecard included the assessment of economic, environmental and social impacts, the presence of 
tests such as risk analysis or the precautionary principle, the analysis of alternative policy options 
but also EU-specific features such as the common market or the acquis communautaire. The 
European Commission’s early IAs – Renda concludes – were relatively poor with regards to the 
analysis of costs and benefits, rarely considered alternative policy options, did not provide much 
information on administrative burdens and struggled with recommended tests such as sensitivity 
analysis. More recently, Renda (2011) updated his data and argues that European Commission IA’s 
have improved significantly between 2003 and 2009. The assessment of economic, environmental 
and social impacts has become more systematic and complete with IAs quantifying and monetising 
costs and benefits more frequently. Although the 2006 and the 2011 study come with reflective 
sections on the EU policy context, the overall ambition of these works is descriptive rather than 
explanatory (Dunlop 2006). This also implies that quality of analysis is not discussed in relation to 
usage. Torriti (2007) offers an alternative study on early European Commission IAs, by and large 
confirming Renda’s findings. 
 Cecot et al. (2008) compare the findings of Hahn in the US and Renda in the EU. In 
a similar fashion, Fritsch et al. (2013) compare European Commission IA’s, scored by Renda and 
collaborators, with a unique dataset of 477 IAs prepared by UK government departments and 
agencies between 2005 and 20010. This is the largest dataset so far used for the evaluation of IA. 
Using a scorecard of 90 guideline items, the comparison suggests that policy appraisal in the two 
jurisdictions has improved steadily across the years. UK and EU IAs show similar patterns across a 
number of dimensions, for instance when it comes to the analysis of economic impacts and the 
identification of costs and benefits. Staronová (2010) presents a comparative study on IA in the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
To summarise, scorecard approaches usually share three characteristics. First, they are descriptive, 
i.e. they neither explain differences in quality of IA nor do they take quality of analysis as an 
independent variable and explore the implications of good or bad analysis for policy making. 
Second, scorecards focus on the quality of analysis; they do not study usage of IAs – which is why 
it is difficult to relate such work to our typology (introduced in Section 2). Third, scorecard 
approaches rely on a medium or large number of cases. Not surprisingly, datasets therefore contain 
both excellent and poor IAs, making it difficult to generalise and, once again, to place a jurisdiction 
conveniently in one particularly quadrant of our typology. 
The second proxy used to explore quality is the questionnaire – here we hear the voice of the 
scholar rather than official guidelines. at the UK’s University of East Anglia, have studied the 
quality of analyses in environmental policy appraisal in various European countries (Russel and 
Jordan 2007; Turnpenny et al. 2008; Russel and Jordan 2009; Russel and Turnpenny 2009). Their 
method builds on previous scorecard approaches when it comes to evaluating quality of analysis. 
However, the authors also carried out research interviews to explain varying degrees of quality 
across countries, thereby exploring causal question about IA. Russel, Turnpenny and collaborators 
identify, amongst others, organisational culture and prevalent policy styles as key obstacles to 
effective policy appraisal. Usage of IA, however, does not play a major role in their research, 
though (except Hertin et al. 2009 which does not talk about quality of analysis). 
More recently, two US teams have departed from previous scorecard approaches. This scholarship 
uses questionnaires exploring features of the IA deemed relevant by the scholar rather than 
guideline requirements. Information gathered would then be scored on an x-point scale (the authors 
use various scales) and convert this information later into quantitative data for comparative 
purposes. What is more, the authors evaluate the quality of analysis mainly with a view to relate 
quality of analysis to other factors, i.e. to explore a causal relationship. Once again, usage of IA 
does play a role in those studies. Due to the large number of IA’s assessed, this research cannot find 
a clearly identifiable home in our typology; the IA’s assessed are simply too diverse. 
 Shapiro and Morall III (2012) evaluate the quality of 109 US IAs published between 
2000 and 2009 to correlate quality of IA analysis and the amount of net benefits identified in each 
IA, testing the hypothesis that the quality of IA analysis reflects the economic significance of a 
regulatory proposal. Work published in 2013 explores whether the time spent on regulatory 
oversight depends on the quality of analysis (Shapiro and Morall 2013). To this end, the authors use 
nine guiding questions, initially developed by the US Office of Management and Budget (OMB) – 
the national oversight body. The questionnaire covers, amongst other things, problem definition, 
policy alternatives, quantification and monetisation, uncertainty, and distributional effects. 
Interestingly, the authors found “a negative relationship between information provided by the 
analysis and the net benefits of the rule … [T]hose rules that most barely clear the net benefit 
threshold had the least useful analyses supporting them.” (p197). 
 Based at George Mason University, Washington, a team directed by Jerry Ellig uses 
a questionnaire of up to twelve items to evaluate the quality of analyses in US IA. The questionnaire 
is similar to the one adopted by Shapiro and Morrall but includes a couple of additional questions, 
for instance whether citizens and other users would be able to locate, understand and verify 
assumptions, data and arguments. Ellig et al. (2012; 2013) also try to learn something about usage 
of IA, asking to what extent the analysis would affect decisions in the proposed rule. Because the 
authors study draft rather than final IAs, however, the answer is quite speculative; there is not 
empirical data on actual usage. Ellig and colleagues findings do not significantly change the overall 
picture presented by Hahn a couple of years before. However, the Washington team brings in a 
couple of nuances, for instances the difficulties experiences by US regulators to report adequately 
on the policy problem to be tackled or market failures identified. Key publications arising from this 
research are Belcore and Ellig (2008) on homeland security IAs, Ellig and McLaughlin (2012) on 
all IAs published in 2008, and Ellig, McLaughlin and Morrall III (2013) on all economically 
significant regulations between 2008 and 2010. In their later work the authors also try to isolate the 
effect of midnight regulations and ideological differences between the government and independent 
regulatory agencies. 
Finally, let us have a brief look at qualitative case studies on IA quality. Generally, case studies 
trying to analyse, and perhaps replicate, one or two specific policy appraisals are still in great 
demand. However, see above, we have to keep in mind the difficulties related to this method. 
Examples include the work done by Harrington, Heinzerling and Morgenstern (2009) on three rules 
prepared by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and Torriti (2010) who studied the 
European Commission IA on the liberalisation of the EU energy market. It appears the analyses 
were weak in the studied cases, but usage is not discussed – hence we do not know whether those 
cases belong in quadrants 1 or 2 of our typology. 
 
Utilisation 
There are not many links between the literatures on the robustness and scope of analysis and usage. 
First, a few people only work on both dimensions of quality. Second, while both US and European 
scholars have contributed to the literature on analysis, work on usage is a bit more Europe-centric. 
This has implications for theory and research directions: a majority of scholars looks into evidence-
based policy making and learning, but neglects the bureaucratic control and oversight dimension – 
the original contributions to this field oversight come from the US. Third, students of usage prefer 
to rely on qualitative case study designs. These approaches are difficult to reconcile with the strong 
quantitative focus of the quality of IA analysis camp.  
There are plenty of suggestions about how IA can be used in policy making (see, for instance, 
Radaelli 2010a; Dunlop et al. 2012). We discuss two of them: evidence-based policy making 
(learning) and oversight (control). 
With regards to learning, a simple assumption that follows from our typology, would be that IA is 
either used for learning – or not. Many authors do indeed emphasise the absence of learning. IA 
then take a mere symbolic role in the policy process (Hertin et al. 2009; Radaelli 2010a; Schrefler 
2010; Rissi and Sager 2012). On the other hand, authors describe and theorise quite a few occasions 
in which IA contributed to learning in decision-making. Authors thereby distinguish three types of 
learning: instrumental, conceptual, and political. This distinction reflects earlier research on 
learning (see, for instance May 1992). 
 As the ideal-type of evidence-based policy, instrumental learning occurs when IAs 
support decision makers through data, models, predictions. Authors provide plenty of evidence that 
this actually occurred in case studied (Hertin et al. 2009; Radaelli 2010a; Schrefler 2010). 
 Conceptual learning describes the possibility that actors change, due to the IA, more 
fundamentally their way of thinking about specific policy problems and solutions. The literature 
reports much less instances of conceptual than of instrumental learning (Hertin et al. 2009; Rissi 
and Sager 2012). 
 Political learning is a more strategic approach to using evidence generated in policy 
appraisals. Hertin et al. (2009), for instance, report of policy makers justifying pre-existing policy 
priorities through knowledge gathered in IAs. Other authors argue that decision makers represent 
knowledge in a one-sided way in order to strengthen their line of reasoning in public or use IA 
information to improve their position in the political realm more generally (Rissi and Sager 2012; 
Schrefler 2010). 
 The question that we take from this literature therefore is not whether usage of IA 
occurs in evidence-based policy making. The question is: which kind of learning – and is this 
(partly) dependent on the quality of analysis, i.e. whether the evidence base is good or bad, disputed 
or widely shared. This leads us to consider causal factors influencing the type of learning that 
authors observed. 
In a nutshell, the literature appears to be much more diverse if we look into causal factors proposed 
in the literature. Schrefler (2010) suggests, on the basis of three in-depth case studies carried out 
inside the UK telecoms regulator, that the level of policy conflict, public and parliamentary support 
for policy proposals, and the magnitude of and (non-)controversy about data, methods, models 
available in a policy field play a key role. We find the third factor – data in the widest sense – 
particularly useful in this context, as this relates to the above question how quality of IA analysis 
and usage in policy making relate to each other. Nevertheless, the evidence is inconclusive so far, 
much more research is needed to refine this potential relationship (and we hope our typology may 
help here). Furthermore, Hertin et al. (2009) identified pre-existing political commitments, legal 
requirements and the interests of key actors as key drivers for usage of IA evidence in policy 
making (for a similar argument, see Turnpenny et al. 2008). Strong institutionalised commitments 
towards cost-benefit analysis and requirements to express policy options in economic terms would, 
for instance, discourage regulators to think outside the box and engage in conceptual learning. Sager 
and Rissi (2011), finally, emphasise the importance of different modes of democratic organisation. 
For example, there is generally less scope for expert-based input in direct-democratic systems such 
as Switzerland. To summarise, while exciting work has been done on usage of IA from an evidence-
based policy perspective, these studies rarely conceptualise systematically quality of analysis as an 
influential factor. Consequently, it is too early to place previous scholarship conveniently in specific 
quadrants of our typology. 
We found less scholarship dedicated to the usage of IA from an oversight perspective. We know 
that academics and policy makers alike emphasise the opportunity to use IA this way, we also know 
a lot about the respective oversight bodies in the US (West 2005), the EU (Wiener and Alemanno 
2010) and the UK (Gibbons and Parker 2012, 2013). However, we know little about their 
effectiveness in controlling the bureaucracy and overseeing regulatory proposals. Previous work 
includes, on the one hand, Shapiro and Morrall (2013) who studied the relationship between quality 
of policy appraisal and time spent on drafting and reviewing IAs. They confirm a positive 
correlation exists but the causal direction is unclear to date. Review bodies might take longer to 
scrutinise long and rich IAs. Alternatively, however, IAs reviewed in a long process might, because 
of the long process, just become better than IAs that have received less attention. On the other hand, 
Radaelli (2010a, 2010b) explored the usage of IA in seven countries. Likewise, the evidence is 
inconclusive and “does not enable us to separate neatly the three ideal types of control, rationality 
and public management reforms” (p180). 
To conclude, although there is a rich literature on both quality of IA analysis and quality (and types) 
of usage, there is little dialogue between these two strands of research. Our typology, introduced in 
Section 2, is designed to encourage research trying to tackle exactly this relationship. 
 
4. Conclusions 
In this article we have discussed the quality of IA and reviewed the literature available. We focused 
on two dimensions: the analysis and overall evidence-base provided by the IA, and what regulators 
do or don’t do with the results of appraisal. By considering the two dimensions of analysis and 
utilization independent, we have generated four scenarios that help us focus the discussion of the 
literature. 
One result of our reading of the literature is that there is a strong division of labour between those 
who work on one dimension and the other. This also reverberates on the choice of methods. It is 
easier to talk about usage of IA by using qualitative methods and case studies, whilst it’s natural to 
compile scorecards to generate data on the analysis contained in the appraisals produced by a given 
government. 
The second result of our typological suggestion is that the next step is to link the two dimensions – 
but this has been done rarely up until now. Indeed, we can formulate testable hypotheses by linking 
analysis to usage. We argue that low quality analysis is more prone to manipulation and political 
learning in usage. Low quality analysis can also be used symbolically, for example to report to the 
OECD that ‘our country produced more than 100 appraisals of new legislation last year’. In short, 
there are many ways to utilization of low quality IAs, including getting legitimacy in international 
circles. And of course low quality analysis is easy to ignore, or forget in a draw at the office. Our 
hypothesis is therefore that low quality analysis tends to associated either with non-usage of 
manipulations. Robust analysis is more difficult to distort, hence the hypothesis in this case is that 
elected policy makers either ignore it altogether or use it to learn instrumentally. 
The third result is that analysis and utilization are also useful for the discussion of a dilemma as old 
as the Weberian analysis of bureaucracy: do politicians control the bureaucracy? Can the 
bureaucracy escape the controls and exercise autonomy? With high quality analysis and coherent 
utilization the bureaucracy has an important role to play in regulatory choice. If the analysis is 
strong but ignored at the moment of choice, one could reason that IA is nothing more than a fire-
alarm system to alert the constituencies supporting the decision maker. Unless the IA rings bells that 
alert the minister, there is no need to pull the alarm. The politician may also use IA requirements to 
saddle the agencies and delay regulation, or simply increase the cost in time and analysis (for the 
agency) to produce regulation: IA as grit that makes the regulatory machine more difficult to 
operate, and slower. 
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